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Mexico Financing Package 1989-92
In the period which has elapsed since the launch of the
Brady Initiative on March 10, 1989, the creditor
community has focused on Mexico as a test case.
The resulting financing package agreed between
Mexico and the Advisory Committee representing
commercial banks has been resisted by the wider
banking community to the extent that commitments
to provide a balanced response to the country's
invitation have been found lacking. The dearth of new
lending from the banking community reflects two
major flaws in the Brady Initiative.
These are:
- the unwillingness of commercial banks to provide
new lending:
The success of a Brady-inspired package rests on an
appropriate measure of debt reduction and debt
service reduction, accompanying a supply of new
lending. Any proposal to prioritise the dual aspects of
debt reduction will result in an unbalanced menu of
options and the incompatibility of new lending and
debt forgiveness.
Excessive emphasis on debt reduction will mean that
many banks which pursue that route will consider
themselves to have exited from a country and will not
expect to be called upon for additional financing of
any kind in the future. L.enders may seek to withdraw
any remaining voluntary trade and interbank lines.
- the scale of debt reduction:
The response to the Mexican package is estimated, at
best, to save the country less than $1 bn in external
interest payments each year. This is equivalent to
around 10 per cent of Mexico's total interest payments
to external creditors and cannot, in isolation, be
expected to have a major impact on growth prospects.
The projected saving on external debt service equates
to about 5 per cent of domestic interest payments and,
therefore, will only have a marginal impact on the
country's ability to meet domestic obligations.
Though the Mexico proposal is the largest of its kind
so far attempted, the scale of achievement is
insufficient to have a material impact on the country's
economic prospects. As a result the Brady Initiative
barely scratches the surface of the Debt Crisis.
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(A) What is Your View of the Brady Plan for
Mexico?
Perception of Brady Initiative
In the aftermath of the launch of Secretary Brady's
Initiative, the process of debt rescheduling has been
destabilised and debt service disruption increased.
Ultimately the success of the debt strategy will hinge
on the ability of debtor nations to implement
economic programmes which reaccess - on a total
voluntary basis - international capital markets.
Against this objective the ambitions of the Brady
Initiative look vulnerable. In particular the Initiative
has:
Heavily underplayed the need of developing countries
for new lending, not only to fill financing 'gaps' but
also to achieve growth and thereby attract investment.
The unwillingness of banks to provide new lending
reflects a radical change in attitude and calls into
question the future source of funds to meet the needs
of the developing nations;
Raised expectations of both performing and non-
performing debtors for debt forgiveness to an
unobtainable level but has failed to provide resources
on a matching scale;
Placed excessive emphasis on promoting debt
forgiveness which is not an end in itself and will not, in
isolation, restore sustained growth and ensure access
to capital markets;
Provided the wrong incentive to countries, encouraging
delinquency in debt servicing and forestalling
economic adjustment plans in the expectation of
winning debt reduction. The better managed countries
are disadvantaged;
Created a view within the banking community that
debt reduction or debt service reduction aimed at bank
lending in isolation is not an equitable sharing of the
burden;
Broken the earlier link between IMF finance and the
maintenance of interest payments to banks (the Fund
will now advance credit to a country even if it is in
arrears to its bankers).
* This section has been extracted from a slightly longer joint
memorandum submitted to this 1-louse of Commons
Committee, dated 17th January. 1990.
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Contribution of Creditor Community
Once the problems confronting a country have been
diagnosed then a solution should be tailored to meet
the specific situation. New lending or short-term debt
service reduction would be appropriate to cover a
liquidity shortfall whilst debt reduction is needed
when the country's solvency is at stake.
On the occasions that it is considered necessary to
provide a wide ranging menu of options then
voluntary debt reduction and debt service reduction,
debt buy backs, new lending by banks and measures to
attract private capital must be promoted as an integral
package. Focus on any one component to the
exclusion of the others will undermine the whole
effort.
In this regard it was encouraging to hear Mr. Brady, in
his speech to the IMF in September 1989, state:
Several countries ....re already working toward
new financing packages consistent with the
strengthened strategy. As they discuss their needs
and options with the international financial
institutions and banks, their varied interests have
become increasingly clear. While reducing debt
burden has been the emphasis of many, new
financing is still important for many countries.
Although the elements and the mix will vary from
case to case, it is important that there be a proper
balance between new money, debt and debt service
reduction.
Therefore, new lendiñg must be attracted through a
more flexible stance in the provision of enhancements.
Resources allocated by international financial
institutions should be totally fungible and used in
whichever way ensures maximum benefit to a country.
To ensure that the impact of an agreed financing
programme is at a level which strengthens a country's
economic prospects the Brady Initiative should extend
beyond bank borrowing and capture the debt owed to
the official sector. Rescheduling or restructuring this
exposure through the Paris Club is no longer
sufficient.
The longstanding debt crisis can only be resolved
through cooperative effort and an equitable sharing of
the burden. The political will of industrialised
countries to participate in the solution - through the
commitment of a meaningful amount of resources
appears to be lacking.
(B) What Role should Government and the
Bank of England respectively play in
relation to Debts to Commercial Banks
owed by Other Countries?
(i) Government
HM Government has adopted a low profile in the debt
crisis and appeared slow to react when the Brady
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Initiative was launched. Chancellor Lawson
emphasised his opposition to any solution which
transferred the problem from the private to the public
sector and initially resisted the use of IMF/IBRD
funds to support interest reduction programmes.
Eventually the Government relented but, along with
certain other G7 countries, insisted on a strict set of
guidelines governing the use of resources devoted
towards enhancements. The guidelines are seen by
many banks to be unhelpful to the smooth
implementation of debt relief programmes.
Any suggestion that under the Brady Initiative the
official sector is taking over the burden from the
commercial banks must be dispelled.
Indirectly and through the multilateral institutions,
the Government should ensure the continuation of
adequate economic programmes in debtor countries
and adequate conditionality between such programmes
and financing packages.
Another major role played by the Government is
through the París Club. In this area the Government
has made it clear that requests for rescheduling of
principal and/or interest from Third World countries
will result in exclusion of that country from additional
financing. In an environment in which the commercial
banks are actively involved in rescheduling and are
now being confronted with involuntary debt reduction
it would be helpful to have a more relaxed attitude on
the part of Paris Club members towards maintaining
rescheduled countries on cover.
An equitable sharing of the burden would demand
that Paris Club lenders afford debt relief alongside
commercial banks.
It is recognised that on occasions a third-party can
usefully mediate between debtor and creditor, but it is
regrettable that the political interference of the US
authorities in the negotiations between the Bank
Advisory Committee and Mexico reached unacceptable
levels.
(ii) Bank of England
The central role of the Bank has predictably been one
of prudential regulation. The principal feature of
regulation is the Matrix which is accepted by many as
logical and one of the more rational approaches to the
problem.
Rather like most systems of country risk assessment
used by banks, the Matrix suffers to a certain extent
from being backward looking. It implicitly assumes
that past behaviour is a guide to future behaviour. In
an environment where debtor nation attitudes
towards rescheduling and interest moratoria are
influenced by official interventions such as the Brady
Initiative previous patterns can be misleading.
A critical role for the Bank is to ensure that UK banks
are not disadvantaged in relation to international
competition through the provisioning guidelines set-
the 'level playing field' concept. Under the Mexico
proposals the Bank of England policy is heavily
weighted towards debt reduction, whilst in certain
other countries debt reduction and debt service
reduction are treated in a similar manner with
collateralised par and discount bonds deemed to
constitute non-Mexican risk.
(C) What is your View of the Bank of England
Matrix for provisioning against Third
World Debt and whether the Inland
Revenue should allow against Tax,
Provisions for Such Debts in Excess of the
Requirements of the Matrix?
(j) The Matrix
The Bank of England matrix has been very useful in
providing an objective method of determining the
relative riskiness of different countries through the 15
factor scoring system, though the Revenue and the
banks have sometimes reached different scores.
Meetings between the British Bankers' Association
and the Revenue on the tax deductibility of provisions
against Third World debt have brought the Revenue
from a position where they wanted a discount on th
percentage provisions indicated by the Matrix to one
where (with one exception) they broadly accept the
results of the Matrix.
The exception is Brazil, where the 1988 rescheduling
caused the Matrix to indicate an improvement, though
the banks (and the Bank of England) believe it is an
apparent rather than real improvement.
The difference of opinion over Brazil in 1988 is the
only major obstacle to agreement with the Revenue of
the main Country Risk Provisions for 1987 and 1988.
That said, some banks contend that provisions
charged in the accounts in excess of the Matrix should
be allowed for tax purposes, based on the considered
opinion of the bank as to the likely amount of
irrecoverable debt.
(ii) The Tax Legislation
The Taxes Act 1988 states on the tax deductibility of
debts:
no sum shall be deducted in respect of:
(i) any debts, except bad debts proved to be such,
and doubtful debts to the extent that they are
respectively estimated to be bad, and in the case of
the bankruptcy or insolvency of a debtor the
amount which may reasonably be expected to be
received on any such debt shall be deemed tobe the
value thereof.
The above section frequently poses problems when
negotiating normal commercial bad debt provisions
with the Revenue, almost always with the meaning of
doubtful debts to the extent that they are respectively
estimated to be bad', even where company accounts
and other financial data are available. Differences of
opinion arise as to the extent of the likely loss, often on
the realisable values of the assets in the event of a
liquidation.
If these questions pose difficulties in normal
commercial situations the difficulties of estimating
losses is greatly magnified when considering sovereign
risks where governments, government agencies and
the availability of foreign exchange for private sector
debtors to discharge their obligations are factors to be
taken into account. After all, it was said at one time
that countries do not go bankrupt, but events over
recent years might suggest otherwise.
The challenge, then, is to determine - with or without
a Matrix - the extent to which Third World debts are
bad. Whilst the Matrix can assist in setting a floor on
the provisioning level, it could also impose a ceiling
when dealing with the Revenue; because if they
recognised the Matrix they would not reckon to allow
relief on provisions in excess. On the other hand, if the
directors of a bank have, after due consideration,
estimated the extent of the irrecoverability of their
Third World debt and provided for the shortfall, this
can be argued to satisfy the requirements of the tax
legislation, and even if the resultant provisions exceed
the Matrix levels the relief should be given. The
Revenue, though, have the right to question the basis
on which the estimate of loss has been made.
(iii) A Revised Matrix
The most subjective feature of the existing Matrix is
the alignment of the percentage provision bands
against bands of scores. The present alignment was
considered appropriate in 1987 and (presumably) in
1988, but with the increased perception of risk in 1989,
many banks have moved provisioning percentages
above the old readacross levels in their half yearly
results, and in some cases to even higher levels since
then.
The Bank of England is expected to issue a revised
Matrix in the near future. It is expected that it will
broadly support levels of provisions averaging around
50 per cent, i.e. the levels reached in the UK banks'
1989 half year results. Provisions above the 50 per cent
level will be unlikely to be tax deductible unless the
Revenue, of their own volition or under political
pressure, accept the argument put forward by several
of the major international banks, that their loans to
Third World countries will not be recovered to any
material extent. The loss may result from debt
forgiveness, debt service reduction, sale of the debt,
swapping for other debt or equity, or simply never
being repaid.
In all these circumstances, a case could be made that
losses should be allowed for tax purposes and that the
relief should be given at the time that the lending bank
records the estimated amount of the loss in its
accounts.
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